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Abstract
Does the "soft side" of management matter? Many managers assert that "firm culture" is strongly correlated
with productivity, but there are few robust tests of this assertion. In a set of field experiments, we study driver
productivity within a large US logistics company that is arguably transitioning from one relational contract to
another, while leaving formal practices and incentives unchanged. We find that sites under the new contract
are associated with 1/8 percent higher productivity. Our findings suggest that relational contracts have a first-
order effect on productivity and that they can be altered over time.
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How important are factors such as “firm cul-
ture” and “employee engagement” in driving 
firm performance? Increasing evidence from a 
wide range of fields suggests that productivity 
differs widely across firms, even after the inclu-
sion of careful controls for factors such as cap-
ital intensity, labor quality, and the structure of 
demand (see, for example, Chew, Bresnahan, 
and Clark 1990 and Syverson 2004). Several 
researchers have suggested that one possible 
cause of this productivity dispersion is the het-
erogeneous adoption of managerial practices 
such as the use of high-powered incentive sys-
tems, explicit performance targets, selective 
recruiting, and skills training (e.g., Kochan et al. 
1986; MacDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi 1997; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012).
But a long tradition of work in organizational 
behavior and organizational psychology sug-
gests that the successful adoption of productivity 
enhancing managerial practices requires com-
plementary changes in the firm’s “culture” or in 
the structure of social relationships within the 
firm (see, for example, Blader and Tyler 2009; 
Tyler and Blader 2000; Collins and Smith 2006; 
Edmonson and Lei 2014; and Gittell 2002). 
Recently Gibbons and Henderson (2013) have 
suggested that one way to formalize this insight 
is through a focus on the role of relational con-
tracts within the firm. They suggest that com-
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petitively significant  managerial practices rely 
for their effectiveness on the performance of 
actions that cannot be specified in advance or 
contractually verified ex post, citing, for exam-
ple, Nordstrom’s instruction to its sales asso-
ciates to “use good judgment in all situations.” 
They hypothesize that this implies that the per-
formance effects of management practices will 
be contingent on the presence of appropriate 
relational contracts within the firm.
This is an intriguing idea and consistent with 
a number of qualitative accounts of the role of 
relational contracts in shaping firm performance 
(see, for example, Helper and Henderson 2014 
and Gittell 2002). In this paper, we explore a 
related question: do relational contracts have a 
direct impact on performance? As far as we are 
aware, this has not been the subject of any sys-
tematic empirical test. To this end, we report the 
first results from a research program designed 
to be a first step in this direction. We use the 
quasi-randomized rollout across multiple sites 
within a single firm of an intervention designed 
solely to change the nature of the social rela-
tionships within the site—an intervention we 
interpret as changing the relational contracts in 
place—to ask whether changing relational con-
tracts alone has an effect on performance. Below 
we present some suggestive evidence from a 
pilot study suggesting that they do. In a sepa-
rate paper (Blader, Gartenberg, and Prat 2015), 
we report findings from a second study that 
explores the complementarities between mana-
gerial practices and relational contracts.
I. Research Site and Design
Our research site is a large US trucking com-
pany that operates in the less-than-truckload 
segment of the industry, transporting shipments 
that are smaller than a full truckload and larger 
than individual parcels. The company employs 
more than 10,000 drivers, nearly all of whom are 
non-union hourly employees, across about 300 
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sites in the United States and Canada. A central 
feature of these sites—and one that is crucial to 
our research design—is that they operate essen-
tially independently. This feature allows us to 
employ research designs that randomize various 
treatments across sites to unpack the effects of 
relational contracts.
The company is arguably in the middle of tran-
sitioning from one relational contract to another 
via a decade-long program to roll out Lean 
Management (“lean”). Lean is a widespread 
management philosophy, inspired by the Toyota 
Production System, that encompasses both exten-
sive cultural interventions and a broad array of 
formal practices. Our company divided their lean 
rollout into five phases and, at the time of our 
research, was midway through the first phase.
Critically, this first phase involves no imple-
mentation of formal lean practices or changes 
to employee incentives. Instead, it consists pri-
marily of introducing employees to lean princi-
ples, including how “continuous improvement” 
(the organizing idea behind Lean Management) 
occurs primarily through teamwork, collective 
responsibility, and the empowerment of front-
line workers. In a relational contract context, 
this first phase can be interpreted as a costly 
effort by management to announce a change in 
the prevailing contract. This effort by the com-
pany is consistent with Gibbons and Henderson 
(2013) and Helper and Henderson (2014), both 
of which draw on prior research to suggest that 
the successful implementation of lean tech-
niques requires the development of a comple-
mentary set of relational contracts.
For the purpose of our research, therefore, we 
interpret this first phase as a relational contract 
intervention. We refer to it as “the lean interven-
tion” or “lean,” even though Lean Management, 
in its fullest sense, is far broader and encom-
passes an extensive set of formal practices to 
manage the production process (which had not 
yet been initiated at our company). For this ini-
tial pilot study, we ask: Does the lean interven-
tion alone have a direct effect on performance?
A. Preliminary Results
To identify the causal impact of a relational 
contract on performance, we require a research 
design that randomly assigns a relational con-
tract intervention to some sites and no interven-
tion to others. A study of this nature is currently 
 underway. Since the results of that study are 
pending, here we report preliminary findings 
based on a cross-sectional comparison of sites 
that had and had not already received the lean 
intervention when our study commenced. From 
discussions with management, we believe that 
this previous assignment of lean can be plausibly 
considered quasi-random in that, after an initial 
pilot program in 2011, the lean rollout schedule 
was chosen solely to reduce the travel burden on 
the regional lean manager, and not by the antici-
pated success of lean at any particular site.
We record lean as a binary variable, capturing 
whether or not the first phase of lean had been 
initiated at the site at least three months before 
our data collection. For performance measures, 
we consider three measures of driver efficiency 
that directly reflect fuel usage and truck wear-
and-tear: (i) Gap Score, the percentage differ-
ence between the average actual and “potential” 
miles per gallon expended on a given route;1 (ii) 
Excess Idle Time, a measure of the minutes that 
an engine idles beyond a designated time period, 
thereby wasting fuel, and (iii) Total Fuel Lost, 
an aggregate measure of all the fuel wasted from 
idling, inefficient shifting, speeding, and gear-
ing. A higher value for any of these measures 
represents worse performance.
For this analysis, we use data from daily 
driver routes obtained between September 2013 
and April 2014 across 73 lean and nonlean sites 
and 3,179 individual drivers. These sites com-
prise the control group of a separate study—
discussed below—in which we randomized the 
public posting of driver performance results 
across lean and nonlean sites. Because those 
performance postings affected driving behavior, 
we exclude the treated sites from this analysis.
The histograms shown in Figure 1 show the 
average performance in lean and non-lean sites. 
We can see from these raw comparisons that 
driver performance in lean sites is consistently 
more efficient than in non-lean sites.
Why might the lean intervention have this 
effect? On its face, this result is puzzling since 
no formal changes to operating practices or 
incentives were implemented. Our studies sug-
gest that, under the lean relational contract, 
1 The potential miles per gallon is calculated by the 
truck’s on-board computer on the basis of optimal shift-
ing and speed patterns, given weather conditions and route 
characteristics. 
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drivers adjust their beliefs that the company 
values and respects, rather than exploits, them. 
The observed effect is consistent with Halac and 
Prat’s (2014) prediction that workers’ belief in 
the firm’s management system is a determinant 
of both effort and performance.
Interview data obtained from conversations 
with individual drivers and supervisors are also 
consistent with this idea. For example, one 
supervisor noted how lean had changed his lead-
ership style:
These guys will do anything for me, and 
they’ll do absolutely nothing for other 
people. And I learned a lot of that from 
lean because lean has made me softer, it 
really has. I used to be hard as rock and 
now I feel like I’m a sponge … I still have 
that same pride but it’s—my interaction 
with people is so much different, it’s so 
much different. You’re not treating them in 
a negative way or a negative manner and 
that’s—I was hard as a rock in my num-
bers produced … and if somebody didn’t 
want to get on board with me on my team 
in all likelihood it probably wasn’t going 
to be a very good day for that person. 
Now, it’s with everybody being involved 
instead of just me running the show, it’s 
totally different.
And a driver noted how lean had changed 
relationships within the site:
I think the meetings and stuff have actu-
ally helped just getting people working 
together. So in the lean team, I think there’s 
actually a good amount of camaraderie 
going on. So I think that’s actually been 
good. Now some people I didn’t really get 
along [with, we] are working together.
For quantitative evidence of this explanation, 
we worked with the company to administer an 
employee engagement survey on a subset of 
sites. The survey was individually identified 
in order to match responses to driver perfor-
mance. The survey itself includes 37 questions 
on employee attitudes scored from 1–5, where 
5 is the most positive response. For simplicity, 
we construct an engagement index that is the 
average of all 37 questions. Figure 2 shows the 
distributions of driver engagement for lean and 
nonlean sites. The distribution of driver engage-
ment is noticeably shifted right for drivers in 
lean sites and has a smaller left-handed tail.
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Figure 1. Driver Performance at Lean and Nonlean Sites
Figure 2. Distribution of Driver Engagement in Lean 
and Nonlean sites
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Figure 3 shows driver performance by engage-
ment decile, relative to the lowest decile. While 
purely a correlational result, this figure shows 
a clear association between driver engagement 
and performance.
Table 1 shows the association between lean, 
driver engagement, and performance. Without 
accounting for engagement, lean sites are asso-
ciated with better performance. When engage-
ment is included in the model, however, this 
association attenuates to insignificance.
Together, these results show that the lean 
intervention is associated with higher employee 
engagement, which is in turn correlated with 
better driving performance. Applying a causal 
interpretation, based on the quasi-random lean 
assignment, the findings become intriguing for 
two reasons: first, they imply that relational 
contracts, independent of formal practices, can 
influence performance. Second, they suggest 
that relational contracts can, in fact, be changed 
by managers, albeit in a costly, time-consuming 
way.
II. Directions for Further Work
These results are intriguing but incom-
plete. First, we report average differences in 
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Table 1—Lean, Driver Engagement, and Performance
Dependent variable Gap score   Excess idle time   Fuel lost
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)
Lean −0.2016* −0.1342   −0.0498** −0.0315   −0.0890*** −0.0683**
  (0.1148) (0.1195)   (0.0208) (0.0232)   (0.0301) (0.0320)
Engagement index (Z)   −0.0669*     −0.0182**    −0.0206*
    (0.0368)     (0.0073)     (0.0114)
Constant 3.4083*** 3.4361***  0.0378 0.0454   0.3808** 0.3893**
  (0.4959) (0.5415)   (0.0695) (0.0724)   (0.1476) (0.1612)
Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes
Observations 21,669 21,669   21,669 21,669   21,669 21,669
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.121   0.067 0.073   0.171 0.177
Notes: OLS estimates. Observations represent city driver-days for the subset of observations with associated survey results. 
Engagement index is the z-scored average of the 37 survey questions. Controls include demographic measures (race, age, ten-
ure), number of trucks at site, route distance, route potential MPG, and fixed effects for day of week, calendar date, date since 
EOBR rollout, and region. Errors clustered by site.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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performance levels across two quasi-random-
ized groups of sites. A more convincing test, 
currently in process, is to report performance 
changes across randomized groups. Second, a 
number of important research questions remain 
unanswered. For example, how do relational 
contracts interact with formal management 
practices? How do they interact with other 
aspects of job design, such as formal incentives, 
the degree of workplace decentralization, and 
the nature of actual work performed? How are 
they related to market conditions, such as the 
intensity of competition, uncertainty, and tech-
nological advancement? Finally, more work is 
required to understand the contracts themselves. 
What is the actual underlying mechanism by 
which they influence productivity? And finally, 
how can they be credibly altered and sustained? 
Some of these questions we hope to explore at 
this site and in other settings. We also hope this 
work attracts broader interest and other empiri-
cal research on the topic.
REFERENCES
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, and Andrea 
Prat. 2015. “The Contingent Effect of Man-
agement Practices.” http://www.columbia.
edu/~ap3116/papers/BGP_trucks1118.pdf 
(accessed January 4, 2015). 
Blader, Steven L., and Tom R. Tyler. 2009. “Test-
ing and Extending the Group Engagement 
Model: Linkages Between Social Identity, 
Procedural Justice, Economic Outcomes, and 
Extrarole Behavior.” Journal of Applied Psy-
chology 94 (2): 445–64.
Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2007. 
“Measuring and Explaining Management 
Practices Across Firms and Countries.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 122 (4): 1351–
1408.
Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van 
Reenen. 2012. “Americans Do IT Better: US 
Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle.” 
American Economic Review 102 (1): 167–201.
Chew, W. Bruce, Timothy F. Bresnahan, and Kim 
B. Clark. 1990. “Measurement, Coordina-
tion, and Learning in a Multiplant Network.” 
In Measures for Manufacturing Excellence, 
edited by Robert S. Kaplan, 129–62. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Collins, Christopher J., and Ken G. Smith. 2006. 
“Knowledge Exchange and Combination: The 
Role of Human Resource Practices in the Per-
formance of High-Technology Firms.” Acad-
emy of Management Journal 49 (3): 544–60.
Edmondson, Amy C., and Zhike Lei. 2014. “Psy-
chological Safety: The History, Renaissance, 
and Future of an Interpersonal Construct.” 
Annual Review of Organizational Psychology 
and Organizational Behavior 1: 23–43.
Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. 2013. 
“What Do Managers Do?” In The Handbook 
of Organizational Economics, edited by Rob-
ert Gibbons and John Roberts, 680–731. Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press.
Gittell, Jody Hoffer. 2002. “Coordinating Mech-
anisms in Care Provider Groups: Relational 
Coordination as a Mediator and Input Uncer-
tainty as a Moderator of Performance Effects.” 
Management Science 48 (11): 1408–26. 
Halac, Marina, and Andrea Prat. 2014. “Man-
agerial Attention and Worker Engagement.” 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discus-
sion Paper 10035. http://www.cepr.org/active/
publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?d-
pno=10035 (accessed January 7, 2015).
Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. 2014. 
“Management Practices, Relational Contracts, 
and the Decline of General Motors.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 28 (1): 49–72.
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna 
Prennushi. 1997. “The Effects of Human 
Resource Management Practices on Productiv-
ity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 87 (3): 291–313. 
Kochan, Thomas, Harry Katz, and Robert McKer-
sie. 1986. Transformation of American Indus-
trial Relations. New York: Basic Books.
MacDuffie, John Paul. 1995. “Human Resource 
Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: 
Organizational Logic and Flexible Production 
Systems in the World Auto Industry.” Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review 48 (2): 197–
221. 
Syverson, Chad. 2004. “Product Substitutability 
and Productivity Dispersion.” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 86 (2): 534–50.
Tyler, Tom, and Steven Blader. 2000. Cooperation 
in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Iden-
tity and Behavioral Engagement. Philadelphia: 
Psychology Press.
This article has been cited by:
1. John M. de Figueiredo, Brian S. Silverman. 2017. On the Genesis of Interfirm Relational Contracts.
Strategy Science 2:4, 234-245. [Crossref]
2. . Elite Bargaining and Adaptation 195-224. [Crossref]
3. Erik Brynjolfsson, Kristina McElheran. 2016. The Rapid Adoption of Data-Driven Decision-Making.
American Economic Review 106:5, 133-139. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
